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In philosophical circles, Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630–1714) is known mainly
as the friend, patron, and correspondent of Leibniz. While many scholars acknowl-
edge Sophie’s interest in philosophy, some also claim that Sophie dabbled in philosophy
herself, but did not do so either seriously or competently. In this paper I show that such
a view is incorrect, and that Sophie did make interesting philosophical contributions of
her own, principally concerning the nature of mind and thought.
In recent years there has been explosion of interest in the philosophical
thought of women in the early modern period. This heightened interest has led
to a great deal of scholarship on six thinkers in particular, namely: Princess
Elisabeth of Bohemia, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Astell, Dam-
aris Masham, and Catharine Trotter. It is perhaps not surprising that attention
has focused on these thinkers, given that all bar one wrote at least one philo-
sophical book, the exception being Princess Elisabeth, who restricted her
philosophical writing to her correspondence with Descartes. But even though
these six women dominate the attention of modern scholars, there were other
women who made philosophical contributions in the early modern period.
This paper is concerned with one of these others—Electress Sophie of Hanover
(1630–1714).
Nowadays Sophie is best known as the German princess who was almost
Queen of Great Britain. In March 1701, an act of Parliament (the ‘‘Act of Set-
tlement’’) named Sophie as Queen Anne’s successor to the throne, barring any
further issue from Anne. As she was almost thirty-five years older than Anne,
Sophie suspected that she would not live long enough to inherit the crown, a
suspicion that proved to be correct: she died on June 8, 1714, a little less than
two months earlier than Anne (who died on August 1, 1714). Ultimately, it
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was Sophie’s son, Georg Ludwig, who ascended the throne: following the death
of Anne, he became King George I of Great Britain, the first of the Hanoverian
line that ruled Britain for 123 years.
In philosophical circles, Sophie is known mainly as the friend, patron, and
correspondent of Leibniz, who was employed by the court of Hanover. Al-
though Leibniz and Sophie met often, both professionally and socially, they
still corresponded regularly, and around 600 items of their correspondence sur-
vive today (this figure is inclusive of drafts and other variants).1 One writer
remarks that ‘‘Their . . . correspondence covers all possible subjects.’’2 And it is
indeed broad in extent; for example, some of the topics that came up in the
correspondence were a man who had a sex change (Leibniz 1923–, vol. 14, 8–
9), whether the eighteenth century would begin in 1700 or 1701 (Leibniz
1923–, vol. 16, 75),3 and whether a large tooth dug up in Brunswick consti-
tuted evidence for the former existence of giants (Leibniz 1923–, vol. 8, 30).
Other themes of the correspondence were, as one would expect, connected
with the social and political events of the day, the Hanoverian succession es-
pecially. There was also much exchanging of news, such as births, deaths, and
marriages, details of visitors, journeys undertaken, acquaintances made, and so
on. Another popular topic was philosophy, discussed in fifteen of the surviving
letters from Sophie’s side of the correspondence, and thirty-four from Leibniz’s
side. Moreover, these fifteen letters seem to represent the extent of Sophie’s
philosophical writing; although she did occasionally write about philosophy to
her niece and one of her sisters, as we shall see in the next section, such writings
appear to have been straightforward reports of philosophical ideas she had been
told in person by Leibniz or Francis Mercury van Helmont, whereas in her cor-
respondence with Leibniz, Sophie engaged in philosophical discussion proper.
In choosing to discuss philosophy only in her correspondence with Leibniz,
Sophie took after her sister, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, who discussed phi-
losophy only in her correspondence with Descartes, as mentioned above.
Unlike Elisabeth, however, Sophie gets very little attention in the literature on
early modern thinkers, and even in the literature on women philosophers of
this period.4 Much of what she does get merely repeats the point that she was
the friend, patron, and correspondent of Leibniz, though it is often noted that
she had an interest in philosophy too.5 However, scholars disagree about the
extent of this interest, with most considering it to have been passive, that is,
that Sophie was happy to read philosophy, and to encourage Leibniz to write
about it to her, but little more than that. Others claim that Sophie did dabble
in philosophy herself, but did not do so either seriously or competently. If either
interpretation is true, it would be difficult to quibble with the lack of attention
that Sophie has received from historians of philosophy, and specifically from
those interested in the philosophical contributions made by women in the early
modern period. However, neither interpretation does Sophie justice; the aim of
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this paper is to show that Sophie is deserving of more scholarly attention than
she has heretofore received.
SOPHIE AND PHILOSOPHY
As previously noted, those who write about Sophie commonly claim that she
had an interest in philosophy. The following remarks by Adolphus Ward are
fairly typical:
Beyond a doubt, Sophia was distinguished by an intellectual
curiosity that was still uncommon, though much less so than is
often supposed, among the women of her age. . . . She certainly
had a liking for moral theology and philosophy, which were, in
general, more in the way of the ladies of the period than the
historical sciences. (Ward 1903, 191–93)
Jacqueline Broad tells us that Sophie ‘‘expressed an interest in philosophy’’
and ‘‘was extremely curious about intellectual matters, and encouraged the
philosophical interests of her daughter, Sophie-Charlotte’’ (Broad 2002, 16,
126–27). John Toland, who met Sophie in 1701 and 1702, has this to say of
her: ‘‘She has bin long admir’d by all the Learned World, as a Woman of in-
comparable Knowledge in Divinity, Philosophy, History, and the Subjects of
all sorts of Books, of which she has read a prodigious quantity’’ (Toland 1705,
67; see also Toland 1704, preface, ‰7). Such remarks give the impression that
Sophie’s interest in philosophy was restricted to reading philosophical works
and encouraging such activities in others. It is certainly true that Sophie did
such things. We know, for example, that she read works like The Divine Being,6
Treatise on Hell,7 The Art of Knowing Men,8 Boe¨thius’s The Consolation of Phi-
losophy,9 and Antony Collins’s A Discourse of Free-thinking.10 We know that
Sophie liked to hear and read Leibniz’s philosophical views, and his thoughts
on the views of others. We also know that Sophie sent details of some of Leib-
niz’s views, as well as those of another thinker, Francis Mercury van Helmont,
to her sister, Louise Hollandine,11 and her niece, Elisabeth Charlotte, Duchess
of Orle´ans.12 If keeping abreast of the philosophy of others and encouraging
others to do the same was the extent of Sophie’s involvement with philosophy,
then it would be correct to say that her interest in philosophy was generally
passive. But there is more. Some scholars note that Leibniz and Sophie dis-
cussed a number of philosophical and theological issues face to face.13 From
Leibniz’s side of the correspondence we can determine that such issues included
proofs for God’s existence,14 ethics,15 justice,16 purgatory,17 the existence and
nature of unities/monads18 and so on. Unfortunately there are no records of
most of these discussions, so exactly what Sophie contributed to them is im-
possible to determine. Leibniz did make a record of one such discussion—a
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short document entitled (by Leibniz) ‘‘Summary of what I said in a conversa-
tion with Madam the Electress of Brunswick-Lu¨neberg, in Hanover 29 Xbr
1692’’ (Leibniz 1923–, vol. 9, 14–16)—but, as the title suggests, it records only
Leibniz’s contribution to the conversation. Sophie’s input, if there was any, is
unknown.
The fact that Sophie had philosophical discussions with Leibniz does not, of
course, in itself demonstrate that those scholars who have treated her as no
more than a minor footnote in the history of philosophy (and the history of
women’s philosophy) were wrong to do so, especially since we have no idea of
what or how much Sophie contributed to these discussions. Contrary to com-
mon belief, however, Sophie’s involvement with philosophy extended beyond
reading it, encouraging others to read it, and discussing it personally with Leib-
niz. An examination of her correspondence with Leibniz reveals that she
herself engaged in philosophy from time to time too, stating her opinions and
proffering arguments for them.19 However, the few scholars who have noted
this are generally dismissive of Sophie’s efforts. For example, F. E. Baily insin-
uates that Sophie’s attitude toward philosophy was less than serious:
A perusal of this correspondence leaves the reader with the im-
pression that Sophia looked upon religion and philosophy in
the abstract as the mental equivalent of a physical daily dozen
exercises. She was neither deeply religious nor deeply philo-
sophical but she was an epistolary chatterbox, and philosophy
and religion were two of Leibniz’ pet subjects. (Baily 1938, 119)
Other commentators state, explicitly or otherwise, that Sophie’s philosoph-
ical abilities were very limited, citing some of Sophie’s remarks that suggest that
she had difficulty grasping basic philosophical ideas. For example, Beatrice H.
Zedler writes that ‘‘Leibniz tried to show Sophie that thought and souls cannot
be material, but Sophie will later say that she does not understand what is
meant by ‘thought’ and by ‘immaterial,’ adding, ‘I confess that surpasses me,
perhaps because I do not comprehend the terms well enough . . . to be able to
penetrate to the truth’’’ (Zedler 1989, 49; compare Broad 2002, 135). The pas-
sage Zedler has in mind is this one, from Sophie’s letter to Leibniz of November
27, 1702:
I do not understand very well what thought is, and how the im-
material is passive, for I do not know what the immaterial is nor
how the material-active forms a body with the immaterial. I
confess that this is beyond me. Perhaps I do not understand the
terms of art well enough to be able to penetrate to the truth of
the matter. (Klopp 1873, vol. 8, 401–02. All translations in this
paper are my own.)
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Zedler’s partial quotation of this passage strongly suggests that Sophie was
utterly out of her depth when it came to philosophy, as she struggled to grasp
the relatively simple concepts central to philosophical debate. However, when
this passage is considered in its entirety, such a reading is not so obvious. For
what exactly is meant by the immaterial being passive, and the material-active
forming a body with the immaterial? As with all things, of course, the context is
important. In this case, the context is a paper or set of papers written by Jakob
Heinrich von Fleming (1667–1728), a Saxon nobleman who visited the court
of Berlin in the fall of 1702. Unfortunately it is difficult to piece together
Fleming’s views with any precision as his writings from this time have since
been lost. Probably the most enlightening exposition of Fleming’s views ap-
pears in Leibniz’s letter to Sophie of November 18, 1702. In this letter, Leibniz
explains that Fleming had written a paper
in which he says that the immaterial is active, and the material
passive. And that an inferior activeness, having formed a body
with its passiveness, is very often subject to another superior ac-
tiveness, that in this way simple life forms a living body; but that
a higher activeness, to which this living body serves as matter,
forms an animal. And that the animal itself serves as matter
with regard to the activeness that forms man. And that even
man is like matter compared to the supreme activeness that is
the divinity. (Klopp 1873, vol. 8, 396–97)
One of the few things that is clear from this passage is that Fleming had
developed a very abstruse metaphysics; another is that Leibniz expounds it in
much too compressed a fashion to make its claims easily intelligible. There does
exist another paper on Fleming’s views, written by an unknown author and
sent to Sophie sometime in late 1702, but it throws no more light on Fleming’s
doctrines than does Leibniz’s exposition.20 In fact the anonymous author of this
paper also had some difficulty in grasping Fleming’s views: the paper begins
with the author stating that it is not possible to come to a judgment about
Fleming’s philosophy without further clarification. However neither this paper
nor Leibniz’s letter of November 18 contains any mention of thought or ‘‘ma-
terial actives,’’ which were two of the things that flummoxed Sophie in
Fleming’s philosophy. It must therefore be the case that the source of Sophie’s
confusion was another paper, either by Fleming or by someone else writing
about Fleming’s views. This paper has unfortunately been lost, so there is no
way of knowing how lucidly it discussed the terms Fleming used and the phi-
losophy he developed. Without this paper, I cannot see that anyone is in a
position to draw any conclusions about Sophie’s philosophical abilities from
the fact that she was unable, by her own admission, to understand the things
discussed in it.
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Another oft-cited reason for casting doubt on Sophie’s philosophical com-
petence is that apparently she could not understand Leibniz’s doctrine of
unities (that is, his doctrine of monads).21 On various occasions Sophie in-
forms Leibniz that she cannot understand his demonstration regarding
unities,22 that she still does not understand unities,23 and that she may have
an insufficient understanding of them.24 Such remarks have been seized upon
by a number of scholars as evidence that Sophie’s philosophical aptitude was
relatively poor.25 But as with the previous case, such a conclusion is shown to
be somewhat hasty when the context of Sophie’s remarks is considered. If we
conduct a thorough examination of Leibniz’s letters to Sophie on the topic of
unities, what we find is the same argument repeated time and again: there must
be unities because there are multitudes, which can be nothing other than the
aggregation of unities. Here is a typical sample of Leibniz’s remarks on unities
from his correspondence with Sophie:
Now it is evident that there could not be composites without
simples, nor pluralities without unities.(Leibniz 1923, vol. 9,
14–16; Leibniz to Sophie, December 29, 1692/January 8,1693)
unities are souls . . . unities have no parts, otherwise they would
be pluralities; but that which has no parts is indestructible.
(Leibniz 1923–, vol. 13, 46–51; Leibniz to Sophie, October
1696)
because every multitude presupposes true unities, it is clear that
these unities could not be made from matter, otherwise they
would still be multitudes and certainly not true and pure unities,
such as are ultimately needed to make a multitude from them.
(Leibniz 1923–, vol. 18, 113–14; Leibniz to Sophie, June 12,
1700)
I [have] often said that souls are unities, and that bodies are mul-
titudes, that is, that the soul is a simple substance and that the
body is an accumulation of multiple substances. (LBr.F 16, Bl.
52; Leibniz to Sophie, October 31, 1705)26
From all this it is clear enough that unities are simple (in that they lack
parts), that they are souls, and that in aggregation they compose bodies (mul-
titudes/pluralities). This last claim is somewhat puzzling, however, for how can
an aggregate of souls give rise to a body? Leibniz does of course have an answer
to this question (which involves treating material bodies as phenomenal), but
nowhere in his correspondence with Sophie does he divulge it. This means
that, so far as Sophie could tell from what Leibniz had written on the subject,
material things were quite literally composed of immaterial souls. Given the
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obvious difficulty inherent in this view, it is perhaps not surprising that Sophie
was so uncertain as to whether she had properly understood what a unity was
supposed to be.
As it happens, Sophie’s suspicion that she had misunderstood Leibniz’s doc-
trine of unities was well-placed, as is clear from her concern about Leibniz’s
claim that there are many unities (in fact infinitely many). On one occasion
she informed Leibniz that ‘‘one should not speak of unities where there are
several of them,’’ and in an attempt to understand his doctrine she resorted to
interpreting a Leibnizian unity as the world-soul, ‘‘which one could, in my
view, call a unity’’ (Klopp 1873, vol. 9, 77; Sophie to Leibniz, November 21,
1701). Sophie evidently considered ‘‘unity’’ to mean ‘‘unique,’’ or at least to
entail ‘‘uniqueness,’’ which was not Leibniz’s understanding at all. However, to
construe a ‘‘unity’’ in the way Sophie did was not in any way out of step with
the French of her day, since according to the 1694 edition of the Dictionnaire de
L’Acade´mie française, ‘‘unite´’’ at the time meant ‘‘singularite´’’ (647), which in
turn meant ‘‘qualite´ de ce qui est singulier’’ (480), and ‘‘singulier’’ meant
‘‘unique’’ (480). The problem, I suspect, was that Leibniz had failed to inform
Sophie that he was using the term ‘‘unite´’’ in a technical, philosophical sense;
without that important piece of information, Sophie’s belief that he was using
the term in its everyday sense seems far from censurable.
In fact Sophie was not alone in failing to grasp Leibniz’s unities. The Duke
of Orle´ans, son of Sophie’s niece, the aforementioned Elisabeth Charlotte, also
failed to do so, notably after reading one of Leibniz’s letters to Sophie of Oc-
tober 31, 1705.27 After reading this letter, the Duke wrote some comments for
Leibniz in which he construed the latter as advocating the existence of ‘‘soul
unities’’ and ‘‘material unities’’ (Klopp 1873, vol. 9, 169–70; The Duke of
Orle´ans to Leibniz, February 21, 1706). Not only did Leibniz not attempt to
correct the Duke’s misunderstanding, but in a subsequent letter to Sophie he
also praised the Duke’s ‘‘sublime mind’’ and frothed that the Duke ‘‘enters so
well into the heart of the matter, and goes so much beyond what gave him
occasion to discuss it’’ (Klopp 1873, vol. 9, 170; Leibniz to Sophie, March
1706). From this, one would be tempted to conclude that the Duke had in fact
developed Leibniz’s doctrine of unities rather than misunderstood it! In any case,
the Duke’s misconception of Leibniz’s view is less a reflection of his insight and
philosophical acumen than it is of Leibniz’s unwillingness to provide (or his
carelessness in not providing) sufficient information about his doctrine of uni-
ties to make that doctrine easily intelligible from the outset.28
It seems to me that Sophie’s only failing in this matter was her honesty in
admitting that she could not understand Leibniz’s doctrine, which, I submit,
was at best incompletely stated to her, and at worst misleadingly stated. Con-
sequently, in neither this case of Sophie’s avowed inability to grasp Leibniz’s
unities, nor the one previously discussed, of Sophie’s avowed inability to grasp
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Fleming’s notions of immaterial and material-active, and so on, are there suffi-
cient grounds to draw any negative conclusions about Sophie’s philosophical
abilities.
SOPHIE AS PHILOSOPHER
Having examined and undermined the popular misconceptions concerning
Sophie’s lack of philosophical understanding, it is time now to turn to some of
Sophie’s positive writings on philosophy. As noted earlier, Sophie only dis-
cussed philosophy in fifteen of her letters to Leibniz, but from these scant
pickings we can determine that Sophie was a very independent thinker. It
might be thought that given Leibniz’s frequent access to Sophie, and his will-
ingness to expound his doctrines to her both in person and by letter, that
Sophie would have emerged as one of Leibniz’s disciples, as indeed was the case
with her daughter, Sophie Charlotte.29 But the evidence suggests that Sophie
was no blind follower of Leibniz. In fact it is interesting to note just how little
influence Leibniz appears to have had on Sophie’s philosophical opinions. In-
deed, on a number of issues on which Sophie voices her opinion, she takes a
view diametrically opposed to Leibniz’s. For instance, on the matter of opti-
mism, of which Leibniz was a fervent and public supporter, Sophie has this to
say:
if it had pleased God to go to the trouble of creating all at once
all the men of merit that there are, and had spared men the
trouble of generation, it seems to me that his work would have
been more perfect. (Leibniz 1923, vol. 6, 40–41; Sophie to
Leibniz, May 4/14, 1691)
Implicit here is Sophie’s belief that many of the people created by God are
not meritorious, and that such people detract from the goodness or perfection
of the world. Consequently, by including the non-meritorious in his creation,
God’s work is less perfect than it otherwise might have been. This is, of course,
a very common objection to optimism.30 By making it, Sophie clearly reveals
herself to be at odds with Leibniz’s view that God has created the most perfect
of all possible worlds.
And on the thorny issue of whether God saves all or condemns some to
eternal punishment, Sophie writes:
I amused myself by reading a book about the island of Formosa
where eighteen children a year were sacrificed in order to please
a single God. It is much more reasonable for us to think that the
good Lord gave his [son] for us all.31
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Leibniz himself was an advocate of the doctrine of eternal punishment, and
consistently rejected the doctrine of universal salvation.32 Moreover, this was a
view that he was happy to share with Sophie.33 So on the matters of optimism
and universal salvation, Sophie adopted positions that in all likelihood she
knew to be contrary to those taken by Leibniz. But nowhere is the lack of
Leibniz’s influence more pronounced than in Sophie’s position on the nature of
the mind. As Foucher de Careil correctly reports, Sophie ‘‘was a materialist . . .,
and it is known that Leibniz was unable to convert her to the idea of the im-
material soul’’ (Foucher de Careil 1876, 52). What led Sophie to reject the idea
of an immaterial soul in favor of a materialist conception of the mind was her
own reflection on the nature of mind and thought. In the course of this reflec-
tion, she developed several arguments in favor of a materialist understanding
of the mind, and it is to these that I now turn.
Sophie’s first two arguments for the materiality of the mind emerge from a
debate she had with the Abbe´ of Loccum, Gerhard Wolter Molanus (1633–
1722), in late May or early June 1700. In the debate, Sophie argued for the
materiality of the mind, while Molanus argued for its immateriality. Sophie
subsequently asked Molanus to put his arguments down in writing, which he
did, and Sophie then sent Molanus’s paper to Leibniz together with a letter
containing a summary of her own views and a request that Leibniz act as arbi-
ter. The relevant portion of Sophie’s letter, written on June 2, 1700, is the
following:
I will ask you to think about the dispute that my son the Elector
[Georg Ludwig] had on thoughts that, against him [Molanus],
my son the Elector maintained are material inasmuch as they
are composed of things that enter into us through the senses,
and inasmuch as one cannot think of anything without making
for oneself an idea of things that one has seen, heard, or tasted,
like a blind man who was asked how he imagined God and said
‘‘like sugar.’’(Leibniz 1923–, vol. 18, 91)
There are in fact two distinct arguments in this passage, though before we
consider them, we need to address Sophie’s statement that these arguments
were in fact those of her son, Georg Ludwig (later George I of England). For
whatever reason, this appears to be an embellishment on Sophie’s part. Indeed,
Molanus prepared (for Leibniz’s benefit) his own report on his debate with So-
phie, and this report makes no mention of the presence or input of Georg
Ludwig, and instead identifies all the resistance to the conception of the mind
as immaterial as coming from Sophie:
When our most serene Electress [Sophie] who, as you know, is
never able to refrain from paradoxes, interrupted me during
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lunch recently, she provoked me to a discussion about the defi-
nition of the soul and its real distinction from an extended
thing. She then asked me to write down my thoughts on this
matter; I wrote them and sent them to her. The most serene
Electress attacked them and did not even respond to my argu-
ments, but multiplied questions, as she is in the habit of doing,34
some of which were irrelevant while others were very easy to
answer. In the end, she said that she would make you be the
arbiter of this dispute, and to that end would send my paper to
you, which she has done I’m sure. (Leibniz 1923–, vol. 18, 696;
Molanus to Leibniz, June 4, 1700)
We can only speculate as to why Sophie would credit her son with author-
ship of the arguments mentioned in her letter of June 2, 1700, but whatever
the reason may have been, I shall take it that the arguments in this letter are
Sophie’s.
ARGUMENT 1
As mentioned above, Sophie’s letter of June 2, 1700, contains two distinct ar-
guments for the materiality of the mind. The first one is that ‘‘thoughts . . . are
material inasmuch as they are composed of things that enter into us through
the senses.’’ The argument can be expressed thus:
Premise 1: All of our thoughts are composed of things that enter
into us through the senses.
Premise 2: Only material things enter into us through the
senses.
Conclusion: All of our thoughts are composed of material
things.
The second premise I take to be suppressed in Sophie’s account of her ar-
gument. The conclusion says only that our thoughts are composed of material
things, but if this holds good, then it is reasonable to infer that thoughts them-
selves must be material along with the minds in which they inhere.
Leibniz’s response to this argument is to say
as for the material that enters into the brain through the senses,
it is not this very material that enters into the soul, but the idea
or representation of it, which is not a body, but a kind of effort
or modified reaction. (Leibniz 1923–, vol. 18, 113; Leibniz to
Sophie, June 12, 1700)
Such a claim was very common in the early modern period, on account
of the corpuscular hypothesis in vogue at the time. This hypothesis held that
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material objects emit, transmit, or reflect insensible material particles that are
then picked up by a person’s sense organs. Many corpuscularians believed that
these particles then caused motion of the subtly material ‘‘animal spirits’’ run-
ning through the nerves, motion that was subsequently carried to the animal
spirits in the brain. It was the motion in the animal spirits there that was said to
somehow produce a perception in the person’s mind, with both the perception
and the mind generally considered to be immaterial.35 Where this account gets
hazy is in the detail of how motion of the material animal spirits in the brain
could give rise to a perception or thought in the immaterial soul, as corpuscu-
larians generally supposed it did.
Although Sophie does not offer any remarks on the corpuscular philosophy,
she clearly accepts the first part of the account just discussed, namely that
what enters into our senses is material. But that is where the agreement ends.
For instead of claiming that the matter entering through the sense organs ul-
timately produces an immaterial perception, Sophie supposes that the
perception it causes would itself be material in nature. Possibly her reason for
thinking so was the concern, widespread in her day, that it was not clear ex-
actly how a material cause could have an immaterial effect. Leibniz’s response
does nothing to allay that concern.
ARGUMENT 2
Sophie’s second argument for the materiality of the mind in her letter of
June 2, 1700, is this:
thoughts . . . are material . . . inasmuch as one cannot think of
anything without making for oneself an idea of things that one
has seen, heard, or tasted, like a blind man who was asked how
he imagined God and said ‘‘like sugar.’’
This argument requires a certain amount of unpacking. First, what exactly
does Sophie mean by saying that we cannot think of anything without making
ideas of things that we have sensed? In the French of the time (which was the
language Sophie used when writing to Leibniz), the word ‘‘ide´e’’—‘‘idea’’—had
three meanings. It could mean an image (that is, a mental picture), a concept
(that is, a notion, a broad understanding), or a representation (that is, a mental
stand-in for something, which includes but is not limited to images). We can
work out which of these meanings Sophie has in mind by looking at her ex-
ample of a blind man who can only think of God in terms of sugar. It is clear
enough that in this example Sophie isn’t thinking of images, as the blind man
presumably couldn’t visualize sugar even if he wanted to. Likewise, the blind
man presumably wouldn’t be thinking of the concept of sugar when he imag-
ines God. Instead, what the blind man seems to be doing is trying to form a
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representation of God, and the closest he can get is sugar (and presumably it is
the taste of sugar that the blind man thinks of, rather than its smell or how it
feels to the touch). So from this we can establish what Sophie means when she
refers to ‘‘ideas’’—she’s thinking of representations, that is, mental stand-ins for
whatever is being thought about. Her example of the blind man also gives us a
further clue as to how her argument is supposed to work, because the blind man
is imagining God. Assuming that Sophie considered God to be immaterial,
which strikes me as likely, her example involves a blind man attempting to
form a representation of an immaterial thing—God. The best he can do is
think of the taste of sugar, but presumably if he wasn’t blind he would think of
something along the lines of the way God is traditionally depicted—as an old
man with a beard, for instance. This certainly ties in with Sophie’s claim that
we cannot form an ‘‘idea,’’ that is, a representation, of anything unless it’s
something we have sensed, something material.
Although none of this is especially controversial, neither does it lead obvi-
ously to Sophie’s conclusion that thoughts and minds are material in nature. So
where does her argument go from here? The crucial thing, I think, is her view
that we can form representations of material things alone. Sophie seems to take
this point as establishing her conclusion about the materiality of thought,
which makes sense only by supposing that Sophie assumed the truth of a prin-
ciple along the lines of: ‘‘that which represents is always of the same nature as
what it can represent.’’ If we feed such a principle back into Sophie’s argument
and treat it as a suppressed premise, which I think is reasonable, this is the
resulting argument:
Premise 1: Our thoughts can represent material things alone.
Premise 2: That which represents is always of the same nature as
what it can represent.
Conclusion: Therefore our thoughts are material.
The second premise itself, unstated but clearly assumed in Sophie’s letter
of June 2, 1700, is undoubtedly inspired by or derived from the principle,
common with many Greek, medieval, and renaissance thinkers, that ‘‘like is
known by like,’’ or at least from something very similar. Interestingly, this
principle has been used throughout the history of philosophy to guarantee
the immateriality of what is known by or represented in the mind.36 For as
the mind is immaterial (according to many Greek, medieval, and renaissance
thinkers), and like is known by like, consequently that which is known by or
represented in the mind (usually taken to be forms or species) must be imma-
terial too. With her variation of the principle that ‘‘like is known by like,’’
Sophie seems to turn this argument on its head by wresting out the conclu-
sion that the mind must be material because it can represent material things
alone.
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It is interesting to note Molanus’s response to Sophie’s second argument:
[this argument states that] it is impossible to think of something
without forming a corporeal idea of it. For example, if one
thinks of an angel, one imagines a boy who has wings; if one
thinks of God, one imagines an old man with a long, grey beard.
I reply that if the majority of men form ideas like these it is be-
cause we are accustomed from our youth to having only
corporeal things represented in our imagination. Nevertheless,
when I think of God, I leave behind the images by which we are
accustomed to represent him as ideas that are not only false, but
also contradictory, and I consider God as a spiritual being that
has no dependence at all on any other being, or as a being pos-
sessing all the perfections. (Leibniz 1923–, vol. 18, 95; Molanus
to Sophie, June 1700)
What is striking about Molanus’s reply is that it completely misses the point.
His attack is focused on premise #1 in the argument as I have constructed it
above. Molanus evidently construes this premise as claiming that human minds
cannot think at all except in terms of ideas of corporeal (that is, material)
things. Undoubtedly, what leads Molanus to construe it this way are the var-
ious meanings of the French word ‘‘ide´e,’’ which as I noted earlier can mean an
image, a concept, or a representation. When faced with Sophie’s statement
that ‘‘one cannot think of anything without making for oneself an idea of
things that one has seen, heard, or tasted,’’ Molanus apparently construed the
word ‘‘idea’’ in its broadest possible sense, as covering all three of its possible
meanings. Consequently Molanus took Sophie to be saying that we cannot
generate an image, or form a concept or a representation, of anything other
than material things. As such, he had little difficulty in finding a counter-ex-
ample, namely that humans can form a concept of God, who is an immaterial
thing. But as it turns out, this is beside the point, for as I have noted above,
Sophie uses the term ‘‘idea’’ only in its sense of ‘‘representation’’; her claim is
that our mental representations can only ever be of material things. Conse-
quently, Sophie could happily accept Molanus’s point that we can form an idea
(understood as a concept) of an immaterial thing, while continuing to hold fast
to her point that we can form an idea (understood as a representation) only of
material things.
ARGUMENT 3
Sophie’s third argument for the materiality of the mind is to be found in her
letter to Leibniz of November 21, 1701. The relevant passage is this one:
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I am not entirely persuaded that thoughts do not occupy place,
since I find my imagination so full that I remember the past and
yet have no more room for the present, in which I even forget
what people look like. It therefore has to be that something
material wears out or fills up, which produces the memory and
which forms the ideas. (Leibniz 1923–, vol. 20, 77)
To understand this argument, we need to remind ourselves that in Sophie’s
day it was very common to think of the mind as a sort of cabinet, a container of
thoughts,37 which is precisely the conception of the mind that Sophie appears
to assume. I take this to be so from Sophie’s remarks about the imagination
being ‘‘full,’’ having ‘‘no more room’’ for new memories, and that something
material ‘‘fills up.’’ It might be thought that her remark that ‘‘something ma-
terial wears out’’ is at odds with the cabinet view of the mind I have attributed
to her, but I doubt that it is simply because a material cabinet, which is what I
think Sophie essentially took the mind to be, could wear out just as it could fill
up (either of which would reduce its capacity). If Sophie’s remark that ‘‘some-
thing material wears out’’ is thought to be inconsistent with the cabinet model
of the mind, then the only other obvious way of interpreting it is as a reference
to a wetware model of the mind, where mental processes and functions are
thought to be embedded or implemented in the structures of the brain. But it
stretches credibility to think that Sophie held such a modern view.
It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that Sophie conceived the mind as a
cabinet or container. Now what Sophie does is highlight the fact that the hu-
man mind has a limited capacity, as there are only so many memories and ideas
that it can hold. This leads her to suppose that the mental cabinet must be
material in nature. Her reasoning here is presumably something like this: sup-
pose that the mind is a material container and the ideas and memories it
contains are material too. This would mean that there is only a certain amount
of space in the mind, and as each idea and memory takes up some of the avail-
able space, we couldn’t just keep adding them ad infinitum, as eventually a point
would be reached where there is no more room in the mental cabinet to add
any more. So if we think of the mind as a material container, then it’s clear why
it has the limited capacity it does. But if the mind were an immaterial container,
then it is not at all obvious why it should even have a capacity. After all, the
notion of a capacity, that is, a limit to how much a thing can contain within
itself, is very much a material notion, as it trades on the idea of space and things
that occupy space. This is the thrust of Sophie’s argument.
Sophie’s argument presents the materialist hypothesis as the best explana-
tion of certain mental phenomena, like forgetfulness. Given the basic
assumption that the mind is a container of thoughts, which Sophie held, her
argument appears to have some merit. Leibniz’s response to this argument is to
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appeal to his theory of pre-established harmony, which in its popular form
holds there to be a parallelism between events in the (immaterial) mind and
the (material) body, without there being any interaction or direct causation
between them. Hence he tells Sophie:
Regarding the soul’s thoughts, as they must represent what hap-
pens in the body they could not be distinct when the traces in
the brain are confused. So it is not necessary that thoughts have
a physical location in order to be confused. (Leibniz 1923–, vol.
20, 85)
Broadly speaking, Leibniz’s point is that the states of soul and brain mirror or
represent each other, so that what happens in the brain is represented in the
soul, and vice versa. A consequence of this, of course, is that when the brain
deteriorates, as it does with age, the soul experiences a corresponding deterio-
ration in abilities that parallels but is not caused by the deterioration of the
brain. Leibniz perhaps does enough to show that the existence of certain men-
tal phenomena like forgetfulness are consistent with his own theory of pre-
established harmony, but he does nothing to show that his immaterial concep-
tion of the mind is preferable to Sophie’s materialistic one. In fact Leibniz’s
response is far from satisfactory for another reason. As is well known, Leibniz
believed that his theory of pre-established harmony ‘‘gives a wonderful idea of
. . . the perfection of God’s works’’ (Strickland 2006, 75) and admirably dem-
onstrates the extent of God’s wisdom and power (the attributes that conceived
and effected such a scheme). But Sophie could easily retort that Leibniz’s the-
ory is in fact disadvantageous to creatures endowed with minds, for, by making
mental events parallel brain events and vice versa, God has ensured that any
deterioration in key parts of the brain must go hand in hand with a deteriora-
tion in the mind’s abilities, even though the mind itself has not deteriorated in
any way (which it couldn’t for Leibniz, given his belief that it is an immate-
rial—and hence indestructible—soul). Leibniz’s theory may well highlight
God’s skills as an artisan, but it does so by allowing the corrosion of mental
abilities even when there is and can be no corrosion in the immaterial mind
proper. This anomaly is an unfortunate corollary of the pre-established har-
mony, and one that his theory would struggle to explain away.
CONCLUSION
On the whole, Sophie’s arguments hold up well to the objections raised against
them by Molanus and Leibniz, and when placed in their proper context can be
seen as respectable and original contributions to the early modern debate about
the ontological status of the mind. Moreover, in arguing for a materialist con-
ception of the mind, a hypothesis widely considered to be unfashionable and
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even heretical in her own day, and in defending it against the objections of
Leibniz and Molanus, Sophie reveals herself to be an independently minded
thinker prepared to follow her own philosophical instincts, undeterred by the
concerns of others. For these reasons alone, Sophie deserves more sympathetic
attention from scholars than she has heretofore received, and also a more
prominent place in the history of philosophy than is given to those who are
merely friends of great thinkers like Leibniz, or those who have a merely passive
interest in philosophy.
NOTES
I would like to thank Stuart Brown, Daniel J. Cook, and two anonymous Hypatia
referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to
thank Vernon Pratt for helpful discussions on some of the topics in this paper.
1. The bulk of these are available in Klopp (1873, vols. 7–9), and in Leibniz
(1923–, vols. 4–20).
2. Dirk van der Cruysse. See Sophie de Hanovre (1990, 15). Compare Foucher
de Careil (1876, 10).
3. The issue of when the eighteenth century would begin was hotly debated at the
time (see Weber 1999, 15). Leibniz correctly noted that the eighteenth century would
begin in 1701.
4. In one large volume on the history of women philosophers, for instance, Sophie
gets only a single, passing mention, as someone who may have had a conversation with
George Burnet about Catharine Trotter’s Defence of Locke (see Waithe 1995, 123).
5. See, for example, Ogilvie (1986, 166), Kersey (1989, 189–90), Garber and
Ayers (1998, vol. 2, 1464), and Broad (2002).
6. Buchius (1694). See Leibniz (1923–, vol. 10, 68).
7. Anon. (1694). This book was a Dutch translation of some or all of Richardson
(1657). See Leibniz (1923–, vol. 10, 68).
8. des Bans (1702). See Foucher de Careil (1854, 132).
9. Boe¨thius (1697). See Leibniz (1923–, vol. 14, 4).
10. Collins (1713). See Klopp (1873, vol. 9, 393).
11. Kemble (1857, 461–62).
12. Bodemann (1891, vol. 1, 250–51, 257–60, and 264; and vol. 2, 42, 121–23,
130, and 160).
13. See, for example Mates (1986, 26) and Ross (1990, 61).
14. Leibniz (1923–, vol. 9, 14–16).
15. Leibniz (1923–, vol. 14, 54–60).
16. Klopp (1877, vol. 10, 212–13).
17. Leibniz (1923–, vol. 10, 89–90).
18. Leibniz (1923–, vol. 9, 14–16).
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19. Some scholars state that Sophie made comments on Leibniz’s views, which is
true, although such a claim does not adequately capture Sophie’s involvement with
philosophy (see Garber and Ayers 1998, vol. 2, 1464; Fara 2004, 146).
20. See the manuscript held in the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek–
Niedersa¨chsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover, under the shelf mark LBr.F 27, Bl. 171–2.
21. Leibniz in fact uses the word ‘‘monad’’ only once throughout his entire corre-
spondence with Sophie, in a paper written on June 12, 1700 (see Leibniz 1923–, vol. 18,
114).
22. Leibniz (1923–, vol. 18, 119–20); Sophie to Leibniz, June 16, 1700.
23. Leibniz (1923–, vol. 20, 61); Sophie to Leibniz, November 9, 1701.
24. Leibniz (1923–, vol. 20, 77); Sophie to Leibniz, November 21, 1701.
25. See, for example, Foucher de Careil (1876, 15) and Ward (1903, 193). Com-
pare Zedler (1989, 49).
26. I would like to thank the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek–Niedersa¨ch-
sische Landesbibliothek in Hanover for their kind permission in allowing me to publish
this passage from the manuscript.
27. The published version of this letter, found in Klopp (1873, vol. 9, 145–55) and
Gerhardt (1890, 558–65), is in fact an unsent fair copy made from Leibniz’s (no longer
extant) second draft. The version of the letter that Leibniz actually sent to Sophie was
considerably shorter, and is still unpublished. It is held by the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Bibliothek–Niedersa¨chsische Landesbibliothek in Hanover, under the shelf mark
LBr.F 16, Bl. 52–3.
28. This is symptomatic of Leibniz’s general approach to writing philosophy,
which, especially in his correspondence, was generally to reveal as little of his philo-
sophical views as he felt he could get away with.
29. ‘‘[Y]ou may henceforth consider me as one of your disciples.’’ Leibniz (1923–,
vol. 17, 438); Sophie Charlotte to Leibniz (August 22/September 1, 1699).
30. See, for instance, Crousaz (1737, 47).
31. Klopp (1873, vol. 9, 115); Sophie to Leibniz, January 10, 1705. See also Eliz-
abeth Burnet’s travelogue entry for September 19, 1707, in which Burnet records details
of a conversation with Sophie. Among other things, Burnet notes Sophie’s belief that
God will not punish anyone eternally. See Burnet’s Travelogue, Bodleian Library, Ox-
ford, Rawlinson MS D. 1092, fol. 126v. I would like to thank an anonymous Hypatia
referee for bringing this text to my attention.
32. For further information, see Strickland (in press).
33. See Leibniz (1923–, vol. 10, 58–62); Leibniz to Sophie (September 3/13,
1694).
34. ‘‘ut fieri solet.’’ In his book Leibniz et les deux Sophies, Foucher de Careil (1876,
53) provides a French translation of Molanus’s letter to Leibniz, which was originally
written in Latin, and for some reason elects to translate Molanus’s ‘‘ut fieri solet’’ [as she
is in the habit of doing/as she is accustomed to do] as ‘‘comme c’est l’habitude des gens
e´trangers a` ces matie`res’’ [as is the habit of people who are unfamiliar with these mat-
ters]. Foucher de Careil’s French translation is problematic, since it goes beyond what
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Molanus actually wrote; in his letter to Leibniz, Molanus merely complains that Sophie
is by nature somewhat inquisitive and argumentative, but Foucher de Careil’s French
translation has Molanus say that Sophie’s inquisitive and argumentative nature is a re-
sult of her ignorance of philosophical matters, a thought that is not found in the Latin
letter that left Molanus’s pen. Such an inaccurate translation does nothing to rescue
Sophie from her undeserved reputation as a philosophical incompetent. In fact, it may
have helped to cement it, for in a more recent discussion of Molanus’s letter, Zedler
unfortunately elects to translate not Molanus’s Latin but Foucher de Careil’s faulty
French translation of Molanus’s Latin, and hence incorrectly quotes Molanus as saying
that Sophie multiplied questions ‘‘as is the habit of people who are strangers to these
arguments’’ (see Zedler 1989, 49).
35. For a classic treatment of this account, see Locke (1690, II.I.23, II.VIII.4, and
II.8.12).
36. On this, see Balz (1918, 228).
37. See, for example, Locke (1690, I.II.15). This is not to suggest, however, that
Sophie was influenced by Locke. As far as I am aware, there is no evidence that she ever
read Locke, or that she knew of his philosophy.
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